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ARGUMENT 
THE BOARD HAS MISAPPREHENDED THE NATURE AND 
SCOPE OF MRUS APPEAL, AND ITS ARGUMENTS ARE 
EITHER WITHOUT MERIT OR INAPPOSITE TO THE 
SALIENT ISSUES RAISED IN MRUS APPEAL; 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE BOARD IS REQUESTING 
AFFIRMANCE OF THE BOARDS DECISION BASED ON 
AN ALTERNATE THEORY THAT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE RECORD OR THE FINDINGS OF THE ALJ/BOARD. 
I. Nature of the Board's Decision 
In MRTs initial appeal to the Workforce Appeals Board ("Board*') from the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), MRI requested the Board to 
consider "other uncontroverted factual evidence presented at the hearing." 
However, the Board declined to make new factual findings or to alter the ALJ's 
decision in any manner, stating the following: 
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of 
the Administrative Law Judge (R. 128) . . . Since the Administrative 
Law Judge is in the unique position of being an active participant in 
the hearing, interacting with the parties and also questioning the 
witnesses, the Judge's findings will generally be disturbed by the 
Board with great reluctance . . . if there is any substantial evidence in 
the record to support the findings made by the Administrative Law 
Judge, the Board will generally not attempt to substitute its own 
judgment for that of the Judge. In this case the Employer failed to 
meet its burden of proof. There is substantial evidence in the record 
to support the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact, and the 
Board concurs fully with those findings and does not find the 
Employer's challenge to them compelling. The Workforce Appeals 
Board also adopts in full the reasoning, conclusions of law, and 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge (R. 131). 
MRI has not appealed any of the factual findings of the ALJ (as adopted by 
the Board). Accordingly, the majority of the Board's decision—which did nothing 
1 
more than evaluate whether the ALJ's factual findings were supported by 
substantial evidence—is inapposite to MRTs appeal. Furthermore, by adopting in 
full the reasoning, conclusions of law and decision of the ALJ. the Board 
demonstrated the intent to refrain from altering or supplementing the ALJ's 
decision in any manner.1 Therefore, for purposes of appeal the Court of Appeals 
should treat the Board's decision as being the identical to the ALJ's decision. 
II. Standard of Review 
MRI agrees with the Board's argument that—to the extent MRI's appeal 
involves a pure question of fact—the proper standard of review should be the 
"clearly erroneous" or "plain abuse of discretion" standard. However, the Board's 
characterization of such standard of review is incomplete. Another requirement 
for a party challenging an agency's factual findings is that such party must 
properly present the record by marshalling all of the evidence supporting the 
agency's factual findings and show that despite the supporting facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the factual findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence given the record as a whole." EAGALA v. Dept. of Workforce 
Services, 2007 UT App 43, p , 157 P.3d 334, 337; Tasters Ltd, Inc. v. Dept. of 
Empl Sec, 863 P.2d 12, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The only party challenging a pure factual finding in relation to this appeal 
appears to be the Board—to the extent the Board may be challenging on appeal 
1
 Thus, any factual findings, legal conclusions and reasoning of the Board's decision that were inconsistent 
with the factual findings, legal conclusions and reasoning of the ALJ's decision did not supercede the 
ALJ's findings, conclusions or reasoning, and were inapposite to the Board's ultimate "adopted" decision. 
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(either directly or implicitly) any of the factual findings made by the ALJ (and 
adopted in full by the Board) in the administrative proceedings below. However, 
principles of judicial estoppel should prevent the Board from attacking its own 
factual findings on appeal. See, Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. 
Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990) (u[g]enerally in legal proceedings a 
party with knowledge of all the facts will not be allowed to take a position, pursue 
that position to fruition, and later, with no substantial change of circumstances, 
return to attack the validity of the prior position or the outcome flowing from it"), 
quoting from 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver, §§ 68-70 (1966). 
Moreover, to the extent that principles of judicial estoppel do not prevent 
the Board from challenging its own factual findings, as a prerequisite to appellate 
review, the Board should be required to properly present the record on appeal by 
marshalling the evidence. Only if the Board has satisfied such "marshalling" 
requirement, should the Appellate Court proceed to the next step of applying the 
"clearly erroneous" and "plain abuse of discretion" standard in reviewing any 
arguments of the Board that appear to attack the Board's own factual findings. 
MRI has not appealed any of the factual findings made by the ALJ (as 
adopted in full by the Board), but rather, has appealed only certain legal 
conclusions of the ALJ (as adopted in full by the Board). Accordingly, as MRI 
stated in its initial brief, the proper standard of review to be applied to the issues 
presented by MRI in this appeal is whether the particular legal conclusions of the 
2
 The Board uadopt[ed] in full the factual findings of the Adminstrative Law Judge" (R. 128). 
3 
ALJ/Board contested by MRI in this appeal were "rational and reasonable," 
because they were supported by "substantial evidence." 
Finally, the Board's suggestion that the Board's decision should be 
affirmed on an alternate legal ground or theory requires the Appellate Court to 
apply even a different standard of review. In order for the Appellate Court to 
affirm the Board's administrative decision on an alternate ground or theory, the 
Board must not only demonstrate that the alternative ground or theory is apparent 
on the record, but must also show that the alternate legal theory is sustainable 
based on the factual findings actually made by the Board in the administrative 
proceeding. See, State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, \ 9. 76 P.3d 1159, 1161. 
III. Summary of Arguments 
In its '"Summary of Arguments," the Board misconstrued the nature of 
MRTs arguments on appeal, stating the following: 
Petitioner . . . argues that the Administrative Law Judge and the 
Workforce Appeals Board erred in failing to properly consider three 
pertinent facts: that the Claimant was a short-term employee; that 
the Claimant continued to use profane language in the workplace 
after having received a verbal warning for the offending activity; and 
that the Claimant had improperly disclosed confidential information. 
Although those three facts are relevant to MRTs arguments on appeal in varying 
degrees, the Board's purported "'summary" of MRTs arguments on appeal has 
grossly misstated the key elements of MRI's argument on appeal. 
MRTs actual argument on appeal can be summarized as follows: 
The ALJ made one key factual finding and three key preliminary legal conclusions 
4 
(all of which were adopted in full by the Board), which established a prima facie 
case of ^culpability" in this case as a matter of law. The key factual finding was 
that Davis had discussions with production staff approximately twice per week 
wherein he discussed that he felt there were problems with how the company was 
operated, and in which he mentioned that cash reserves were too low and payroll 
was too high (R. 95). The three key preliminary legal conclusions were the 
following: (1) Stephen Davis ("Davis") admitted that he made derogatory 
statements about MRI's finances to nonmanagement and nonaccounting personnel 
(R. 97); (2) the behavior of Davis in speaking negatively about MRI's finances 
was potentially harmful as it could affect employee morale (R. 97); and (3) Davis 
should have known that making negative statements about MRI's finances could 
be harmful to company morale, given his position within the company (R. 97). 
The ALJ's/Boards's other preliminary legal conclusions did not effectively 
rebut, revoke or neutralize such prima facie case of ''culpability/' because they 
were legally irrelevant to the issue of culpability in this case. Such legal 
conclusions were: (1) MRI has not shown that Davis ever provided "specific'" 
financial information to anyone outside of the accounting and management staff 
(R. 97); (2) the proper emphasis under the culpability requirement should not be 
the number of violations; rather, it should address the problem of whether the 
^Despite making the four findings set forth above, which clearly established that Davis improperly 
disclosed confidential information about the finances of MRI, the Board has argued—''unreasonably and 
irrationally"—in its Summary of Arguments (p.5) that "there is no competent evidence in the record to 
establish that the claimant improperly disseminated any confidential information concerning the employer." 
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discharge was necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to the employer's 
rightful interest (R.97); and (3) MR1 could easily have issued Davis a formal 
Vi i l ' l u j i . 111 ' . ( l u i l l c d M*i \ i v a n d il r III i f 111 •, i OIH I l k I \« < »U n I Ul il iro'» L l l ! "" L 
Therefore, the ALJVBoard's ultimate findings, that (1) Davis' conduct was 
not so harmful as to warrant discharge (R. ()"). and (2 i ^ culpability^ was not 
t: laniihiico were noi "rauona! and reasouan.: ami were not supported by 
"substantial evidence/*' not only becai ise they were contrary to the AI J VBoanf s 
own factual findings and preliminary legal conciusions. winch clcarh cslabhshcd 
"culpabuiiA. ma ajso because they were baseu vordy on oihci icg.u condit ions 
t l l a t > . ?• 1 . * . . i : . - • : . - • . . . •• •• ' • • v . 
MR1 met its burden in establishing ^culpability. Whereas the ALJ/Board ii^o 
concluded that MRI established the other elements of "knowledge" and "control/" 
MRI mil ils iuiuk'ii in esiabiisliuiL |usi causi" comu'ning I)a\is discharge. 
IV. Rebuttal of the Boards Arguments 
A. The Boards determination was not supported by substantial evidence 
The ;: ,;u: w^< argued tl lat tl le Board's ul1 imate determination—iha: .•• ml 
failed to prove the culpah:!'iy element of a just cause termination—was supported 
by substantial evidence in Tic record. Ilowever. the Board's determination was 
based on Iai illy legal reasoning, ami iiierdbre. was unreasonable ami malm ^*. 
1 • PTJm tf' facie c a s e o t c ». 1 p a b i i i t y 
(a) Key factual finding 
As has been mentioned above, the AI J made one key factual finding and 
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three key preliminary legal conclusions (all of which were adopted in full by the 
Board), which established a prima facie case of "culpability" in this case as a 
matter of law. 
The key factual finding was that Davis had discussions with production 
staff twice per week, wherein he discussed how the company was being operated, 
and wherein he mentioned that cash reserves were too low and payroll was too 
high (R. 95). It should not take a rocket scientist to figure out that, if a key 
member of the accounting staff (who is perceived to have access to confidential 
information about the finances of the company) repeatedly tells members of the 
production staff (who are lower level employees with no personal input into 
employment decisions or lay-offs) that the company's cash flow is too low and the 
company's payroll is too high, those members of the production staff will most 
likely become concerned and worried about the stability of their employment with 
the company, which will affect company morale—regardless of whether that 
member of the accounting staff discloses more "specific" financial information. 
The predictability of that scenario should have just been common sense to 
anyone with any kind of experience in the workforce. It was easily foreseeable 
that MRI's production workers might conclude that (1) if cash flow was too low 
and expenses were too high, (2) it was because sales were too low, which would 
mean inventory was too high, and (3) that situation could result in lay offs in the 
production department (which produces inventory), putting their jobs at risk. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that such factual finding was consistent 
7 
with and provided substantial evidentiary support for the ALJ's three key legal 
conclusions, which established a prima facie case of "culpability"" in this c::* \^ 
i lai i a •!.;; ; (1) t! lat Da vis i idi i nil let 1 lie i i iade derogato i y state i i lei ii s al KM it IV lRTs 
finances to non-management and non-accounting personnel (R. 97); (2) tllat 
Davis ' behavior in speaking negatively about M R I ' s finances was potentially 
harmfi ill as it ; ;oi ild affect er i lployee i norale (R )' ] ): ai id (3) tl lal Da v'is si 101 ild 1 la v( : 
known that makim? neuaiive statements about M R I ' s finances could be harmful to 
company morale, given his position within the company (R Qn). }\ is also clear 
{'..:••' i..-.: i.iv •>.. ;.!.:MIL: .; - .Miaika -ur^ianik! .;• idence. w h ^ i ; Lhrcci;} 
controverted some of the ALJ'h, Board '- •>;!-.*»• k^-ai ; .^>r ne r u - ^ K ,: t 
because Davis did not share "specific" financial information ahuiu MRTs 
finances. Da-, is conduct was not so harmful as to warrant discharge (R v" . 
P r i i H - i - : - - - : - • ' - I .•••'-.. ' ; •= i.i • "'.. - v •- r
 ( j . ; : i e 
above-described key factual finding on appeal. See, Occidental/Nebraska Federal 
Savings Bank v. Meh\ supra. 791 P.2d at 220 ("[gjenerally in legal proceedings a 
party vviif i ki i :nvledge of all the fad s < • 'ill i i :)"t I ) z allL ;.'" •' '• : • : l "! :."  • 1 ake a | )ositioj i j: )i n si le 
that position to fruition, and later, with no substantial change of circumstances, 
return to attack the validity of the prior position -M* the outcome flo^ inn from \'r^ 
I • ' •" > J . , \ ' l.' - . ' . , : . : !• ' '"IP o n 
appeal, as a prerequisite to appellate review, the Board was required to properly 
present such issue to the Appellate Court h\ marshalling the evidence to 
demonstrate mat Mica Kicm.u : aiding was not supported by substantial evidence. 
8 
EAGALA v. Dept. of Workforce Services, supra, 2007 UT App 43, 1 8, 157 P.3d at 
337; Tasters Ltd., Inc. v. Dept. ofEmpl Sec, supra, 863 P.2d at 18. Whereas the 
Board has not marshaled the evidence related to such factual finding, such factual 
finding should be deemed conclusive for purposes of this appeal. See, Bhatia v. 
Dept ofEmpl. Sec, 834 P.2d 574, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (findings not 
adequately challenged are deemed to be conclusive). 
(b) Key legal conclusions 
As was mentioned above, the ALJ made three key preliminary legal 
conclusions (all of which were adopted in full by the Board), which established a 
prima facie case of "culpability" in this case as a matter of law, namely, (1) that 
Davis admitted he made derogatory statements about MRI's finances to non-
management and non-accounting personnel (R. 97); (2) that Davis' behavior in 
speaking negatively about MRI's finances was potentially harmful as it could 
affect employee morale (R. 97); and (3) that Davis should have known that 
making negative statements about MRI's finances could be harmful to company 
morale, given his position within the company (R. 97). 
In order to establish "culpability," the conduct causing discharge must be so 
serious that continuing the employment relationship would jeopardize the 
employer's rightful interest. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 994-405-202(1) (2000). If 
the conduct causing discharge was not an isolated incident of poor judgment, or if 
there was an expectation that such conduct would be continued or repeated, 
culpability could be established by showing only potential harm (rather than actual 
9 
harm) to the employer's rightful interest. C./, U PAH ADMIN. CODE r. 994-405-
202(1) (20CHMf"fi]f the conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and 
t l * - - • M . e c ! . ! : ' :• 
not be shown."). Conduct that would bring dishonor to the business or that would 
harm employee morale is specifically listed in the applicable regulations as 
col idi ict It lat '"c 'i ilcl harn i tl ie en iplo^ -ei "s i igl ltfi il ii rtei est. See, IJ I AI I 4DMTI J. 
CODE r. 994-405-211 (2000). 
Jn addi-ion. conduc! IN "noi an isolated inciden! of poor judgment." • > J il 
L\'i!St;;LUe^ . a j-ailcrn ol oc\iU\\.A\ c/.. Atison v. UcptofEnipl. SL< :•;• !' ,_.. <<<. 
l 0 2 (• :;:}- ( : ' '"' "-K)'* *
 t ' n p ! n \ :-t \\:, * J i n - •* ' • -•' '•• • • -< -1' r u 
of heha\ior): *>r (2) if the conduct wa^ a \olitional aci b\ an empknee who could 
not have been heedless of the consequences of such behavior, See, Fieeiki v. Dept. 
(potential harm was sufficient to establish culpability, because claimants action 
was not an innocent act of poor judgment or ordinary negligence, but rather. wa> a 
aware because of his experience and training). 
In this case, the three legal conclusions of the AL J/Board described above 
/ '•• ^u.o . • >'LI facie ca>;. • . ,aa .-. . .-\. ;>ecuu>e they expressl ; held 
that (1) Davis engaged in prohibited behavior, u ; u V h w a- ^ • * •'-'* 
to (he rightful interests of MRI whereas it could ailed employee morale, an.: -;J ; 
siich conduct was "not an isolated incident u! poor judgment" whereas Davis 
10 
should have known that making negative statements about MRTs finances could 
be harmful to company morale, given his position within the company. 
Principles of judicial estoppel should prevent the Board from attacking such 
three key legal conclusions on appeal. See, Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings 
Bank v. Mehr, supra, 791 P.2d at 220. However, even if the Board was not barred 
from attacking its own such legal conclusions on appeal, to successfully attack 
such legal conclusions, the Board was required to show that such legal conclusions 
were not "reasonable and rational," by applying the "substantial evidence test," 
which requires the Appellate Court to examine all of the evidence supporting the 
contested findings, and then to determine whether, despite the supporting facts and 
all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence given the record as a whole. See, Petro-Hunt, 
LLCv. Dept of Workforce Services, 2008 UT App 391 \ 20, 197 P.3d 107, 114. 
Based on the "substantial evidence" test, it follows that if the Board desired 
to attack the validity of the three key legal conclusions set forth above, the Board 
should be required to marshal the evidence relevant to that attack—which the 
Board has not done. Whereas the Board has not marshaled the evidence related to 
such legal conclusions, such legal conclusions should be deemed conclusive for 
purposes of this appeal. See, Bhatia v. Dept. ofEmpl Sec, supra, 834 P.2d at 579 
(findings not adequately challenged are deemed to be conclusive). 
4
 The key factual finding described on page 7 above demonstrates that Davis' conduct also constituted a 
pattern of behavior—which could bring dishonor to MRI and detrimentally affect employee morale— 
providing a second basis for allowing "potential harm" to be used in establishing culpability. 
11 
Furthermore, the three ke\ \cvi\\ conclusions described above were 
supported by substantial evidence. [Tie key factual finding described above on 
page 7 pi o1 d( led si ibst ai itia! si ipj :> :.)i t 1 OJ. t h e I irst legal conclusion—and describes 
some of the confidential information disclosed b\ n."\ ^ 
testimony of Marysa Cardwcll. MRTs TIR director, a^  well as f.\hibil>, 8. ! ,. , i 
a-u. -:,... .; - ! . • ; - . i- . •' i'K^ !-5 20-28) all 
supported the second le^;.-: ^ • • 1 Ibnh aho> c 
Exhibit 8 was an anon) mou>> note to Marysa Cardwelh stating that Davis* 
condue! (\\l;^.. i.^iudcd saying things in the break room that sounded \ er\ 
c - " M d . * r 4 - . i l .* i' A -it • - *>-; .' -, - ^ ; . . e 
position statement of MRl concerning Davis* discharge, which stated thai D \ is1 
conduct in telling other employees that MRl was in financial trouble caused a 
employee Lesha Dalebout of MRl, stating that P::\h.* i.-".m\e v;sn^- \ •'• 
company owners created a very negative work em ironnienl. Lxhibii ;o was a 
>• ' ' • .ncn ;.Laied mai \)u\ IN conduct in disclosing MRFs 
confidential financial information to other employees created an i ir ice n llbrtal : le 
work environmeni for he**, i'mall}. Ms. Cardwell testified that employees (the 
:
 • c . \ - i , : ccs sue interviewed) had complained to her about Davis' 
b e h a v i o r i l l p r u \ i d l i V j n e g , ' • • l m : i m i il i M f n r | n ; | | i i i | i il I'll l ln ,i„ i i i p j i i v ;iiuJ' \\iw\ 
that made them .incomlbrtable (R. 57, line 43: R. 58. lines 1-5, 20-28). 
i m lioa/J has argued on page 7 of the Brief of Appellee that such e\ idence 
12 
was hearsay, and therefore, was not "competent" to independently support a legal 
conclusion, pursuant to the "residuum rule." However, such evidence was not 
offered for the truth of such statements, but only to show there was a "perception" 
that Davis' behavior was creating an uncomfortable work environment—which 
inherently created a company morale issue. Whereas company morale is a 
subjective determination, formulated by a company's employees, the mere 
perception by other employees that Davis was causing problems was sufficient to 
prove there was an actual problem with company morale. Cf, Prosper, Inc. v. 
Dept of Workforce Services, 2007 Ut App 281, If 13, 168 P.3d 344, 347.5 
Finally, the third legal conclusion was substantially supported by the key 
factual finding set forth on page 7 above and by the ALJ's additional factual 
finding that Davis had "nearly 30 years of experience in the accounting field and is 
knowledgeable about ethical standards in the field regarding disclosure of 
confidential information regarding his employers" (R. 94-5). 
2. The Board's other preliminary legal conclusions did not effectively 
rebut, revoke or neutralize such prima facie case of culpability. 
In a preliminary legal conclusion, the ALJ/Board placed great emphasis on 
declaring that the confidential financial information disclosed by Davis was not 
"specific"—in an apparent attempt to discount the seriousness of Davis' behavior. 
The issue of employee morale in this case was directly analogous to the issue of customer service in the 
Prosper case, whereas the mere fact that complaints about Davis were made by other employees created an 
inherent problem with employee morale, because employee morale clearly relates to the subjective 
perception of the complaining employees—i.e., if several complaining employees subjectively perceive 
that there is a problem being caused by another employee, regardless of the basis for that perception, then 
there is a problem, and employee morale is affected. 
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However, the Board cited no legal support whatsoever for its arbitrary reasoning 
that disclosure of confidential financial information could be harmful only if such 
information was "specific." In fact, disclosure of "specific" financial information 
may have actually been less harmful to MRI—if specific information would have 
made it clear to the production staff that Davis" generalizations about MRI's 
financial condition were grossly exaggerated, for example. Furthermore, the fact 
that Davis disclosed to the production staff the "general" information that "cash 
reserves were too low and payroll was too high" created at least & potential 
employee morale problem at MRI, and the ALJ made a specific legal conclusion 
to that effect. Therefore, the fact that the confidential financial information 
disclosed by Davis may not have been "specific" was of no legal significance 
whatsoever to the determination of culpability in this case, and such legal 
conclusion did not rebut, revoke or neutralize the prima facie case of culpability 
established by the Board's other findings and preliminary legal conclusions. 
The Board also ruled that the proper emphasis under the culpability 
requirement should not be the number of violations, but rather, should be whether 
the discharge was necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to the employer's 
rightful interest. Apparently, the Board reasoned that culpability should not be 
established merely because the offending conduct was a pattern of bad behavior, 
rather than only one serious incident of conduct. However, as was argued in 
MRI's Brief of Appellant on pages 46-7, the fact that behavior is repeated usually 
increases, rather than decreases, the possibility that the employer's interests may 
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have been jeopardized, and Utah case law is consistent with that principle. See, 
Nelson v. Dept ofEmpl Sec., supra, 801 P.2d at 162. Accordingly, the 
ALJ's/Board's preliminary legal conclusion about the cwnumber of violations" did 
not rebut, revoke or neutralize the prima facie case of culpability established by 
the Board's other factual findings and preliminary legal conclusions. 
Finally, the Board made the preliminary legal conclusion that MRI could 
easily have issued Davis a formal warning or suspended Davis, and it is likely his 
conduct would have improved. However, the evidence in the record clearly 
offered more support for the proposition that Davis was not likely to improve his 
behavior, as MRJ argued in the Brief of Appellant on pages 47-8. In addition, 
MRI only needed to prove either that (1) Davis's conduct was not an isolated 
incident of poor judgment, or_ (2) there was no expectation that such conduct 
would be continued or repeated. Therefore, such issue was inapposite to the 
determination of whether culpability had been proven, because the ALJ issued a 
legal conclusion establishing that Davis' conduct was not an isolated incident of 
poor judgment, as set forth above on pages 10-11. Accordingly, such preliminary 
legal conclusion of the ALJ/Board did not rebut, revoke or neutralize the prima 
facie case of culpability established by the Board's other findings and conclusions. 
It would have been irrational and unreasonable for the ALJ/Board to 
conclude that the numbers—1 and 1—had been proven, and then to conclude that 
the sum of 1 + 1 = 0. It was equally irrational and unreasonable for the ALJ/Board 
to establish & prima facie case of culpability—by concluding that (1) Davis 
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admitted he made derogatory statements about MRI's finances to non-
management and non-accounting personnel; (2) Davis' behavior in speaking 
negatively about MRI's finances was potentially harmful as it could affect 
employee morale; and (3) Davis should have known that making negative 
statements about MRI's finances could be harmful to company morale, given his 
position within the company—and then to arbitrarily make the polar-opposite 
ultimate determination that culpability had not been established, simply by 
concluding that Davis' conduct w;as not so harmful as to warrant discharge, 
without any reasonable or rational logic or explanation for doing so.6 
B. Alternate theory of "no proximate cause" 
1. The Board's alternate argument 
Based on the Brief of Respondent, it appears the Board is also requesting 
the Appellate Court to affirm the Board's decision, based on an alternate legal 
theory, raised for the first time on appeal. The Board's alternate legal theory 
appears to be that (1) there was no proximate cause between the alleged conduct 
stated by MRI to be the basis for Davis' discharge, and Davis' discharge in this 
case, and (2) MRI did not establish sufficient basis for a ujust cause" discharge, 
based on "conduct" other than the stated cause for discharge. 
2. Applicable law concerning the Board's alternate argument 
It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm a judgment appealed 
6
 As was explained on pages 13-15 above, the Board's stated reasoning for its ultimate conclusion was 
inapposite to the issue of culpability in this case, and therefore, was not "rational and reasonable.'* 
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from, if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even 
if such ground or theory was not raised or considered in the lower court. State v. 
Topanotes, supra, 2003 UT 30, \ 9, 76 P.3d at 1161. However, (1) not only must 
the alternative ground be apparent on the record, (2) it must also be sustainable 
based on the actual factual findings of the trial court. Id. 
The relevant portion of UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.994-405-206, which deals 
with the issue of "proximate cause55 related to a discharge, reads as follows: 
R994-405-206. Proximate Cause - Relation of the Offense to the 
Discharge. 
(1) The cause for discharge is the conduct that motivated the 
employer to make the decision to discharge the claimant. If a 
separation decision has been made, it is generally demonstrated by 
giving notice to the claimant. Although the employer may learn of 
other offenses following the decision to terminate the claimant's 
services, the reason for the discharge is limited to the conduct the 
employer was aware of prior to making the separation decision. If 
an employer discharged a claimant because of preliminary evidence, 
but did not obtain "proof5 of conduct until after the separation notice 
was given, it may still be concluded the discharge was caused by the 
conduct the employer was investigating. 
(2) If the discharge did not occur immediately after the employer 
became aware of an offense, a presumption arises that there were 
other reasons for the discharge. The relationship between the 
offense and the discharge must be established both as to cause and 
time. The presumption that a particular offense was not the cause of 
the discharge may be overcome by showing the delay was necessary 
to accommodate further investigation, arbitration or hearings related 
to the claimant's conduct. 
3. The Board's alternate theory is not apparent on the record 
(a) MRFs failure to identify a "final incident" was not legally significant 
On page 5 of the Brief of Respondent, the Board argued that u[a]s the 
Administrative Law Judge noted in her reasoning on the culpability element of a 
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just cause discharge, the employer provided no specific final incident which led to 
the discharge that could be adjudicated." On page 6 of the Brief of Respondent, 
the Board stated that the "Administrative Law Judge who conducted the hearing 
was unable to find a final incident for the discharge." 
In the arguments set forth above, the Board mischaracterized the legal 
conclusions of the ALJ concerning that issue. The actual ruling of the ALJ was as 
follows: 
The Employer provided no final incident that led to the Claimant's 
discharge, but argues that the Claimant habitually "badmouthed" the 
company and the management. The Employer further argues that 
the Claimant was discharged because he revealed confidential 
financial information about the company to nonmanagement and 
nonaccounting personnel (R. 97). 
Although the ALJ ruled that MRI "provided no final incident that led to 
[Davis'] discharge/' the ALJ did riot rule that "the employer provided no specific 
final incident which led to the discharge that could be adjudicated" (Emphasis 
added.) Furthermore, the record demonstrates that the ALJ actually adjudicated 
this case based solely on her analysis and legal conclusions concerning "just 
cause" in relation to MRTs stated reason for discharge—namely, that Davis had 
improperly disclosed MRTs confidential financial information (R. 97). 
In this case, the record shows that the "event" that actually led to the 
discharge of Davis was the discovery by MRI of information—pursuant to an 
investigation—concerning the extent of Davis' conduct in improperly disclosing 
confidential financial information to other employees of MRI and the extent of the 
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harm caused to employee morale by such conduct (R. 7; R. 55, lines 24-29, 39-44; 
R. 56, lines 1-2; R. 58, lines 20-28; R. 67, lines 12-43; R. 68, lines 1-6, 19-26). 
The "conduct" stated by MRI to be the cause for discharge was a pattern of 
behavior by Davis in disclosing confidential, financial information of MRI to 
nonmanagement, nonaccounting personnel at MRI (R. 7; R. 10; R. 55, lines 24-29, 
39-44; R. 56, lines 1-2; R. 68, lines 19-26; R. 95; R. 97; R. 129-130). That was 
the cause for discharge provided to Davis at the time he was discharged (R. 10; R. 
68, lines 19-26). That was the cause for discharge provided to the unemployment 
claims examiner (R. 6-7). That was the cause for discharge presented to the ALJ 
at the formal administrative hearing (R. 7; R. 55, lines 24-29, 39-44; R. 56, lines 
1-2; R. 58, lines 20-28; R. 68, lines 19-26). And, that was the cause for discharge 
actually analyzed by the ALJ in her decision (R. 97). 
The law does not require an employer to provide a "specific final incident" 
as the basis for discharge in order to establish that the discharge was for "just 
cause." UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.994-405-206(l) states that the cause for discharge 
is the "conduct" that motivated the employer to make the decision to discharge the 
claimant. The common legal definition of the term "conduct" is "[a]n action or 
omission and its accompanying state of mind, or, where relevant, a series of acts 
or omissions" Black's Law Dictionary 296 (6th ed. 1990). (Emphasis added.) 
Based on the common definition of "conduct," there is no question the 
"cause for discharge" could include a pattern of behavior—a series of acts or 
omissions—rather than merely a single incident. See, Nelson, supra, 801 P.2d at 
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162 (claimant was found culpable based on a pattern of less serious, but repeated, 
violations of company policy). Therefore, as a matter of law, there was no lack of 
"proximate cause" between the stated reason for the discharge and the discharge— 
nor was there a fatal flaw in MRI's claim of discharge for "just cause''—simply 
because MRI did not specify a "final incident" that led to Davis' discharge, 
(b) A proper time nexus existed between the "conduct" and the discharge 
On page 10 of the Brief of Respondent, the Board argued that MRI failed to 
establish when the alleged offenses occurred in relation to the date of termination. 
Accordingly, by implication, the Board has argued that there was no proximate 
cause—no proper relationship or nexus in time—between the conduct and the 
discharge, and therefore, that there was a presumption in this case that the real 
reason or cause for the discharge was something other than the stated cause for the 
discharge. See, UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.994-4G5-206(2). However, evidence 
supporting such argument is not apparent in the court record. 
As was stated above, the cause for discharge alleged by MRJ was a pattern 
of conduct by Davis in improperly disclosing confidential financial information to 
MRFs production staff. On the face of the record, it is clear MRI first received 
notice of a potential problem on Tuesday, April 29, 20087 (R. 11). It is also clear 
7
 Exhibit 11, entitled "Statement SP - Separation (Discharge)," states the following: "[Marysa Anderson] 
found out 3 days prior to the claimant's termination that he was still being negative and prompted an 
investigation which led to his discharge." The contents of such Exhibit 11 constitute legally competent 
evidence, as a hearsay exception pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 803(8)(C), whereas such exhibit 
is a public report ''setting forth . . . factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to 
authority granted by law." 
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from the record that after MRI received such information, MRI promptly 
conducted an investigation, and then terminated Davis at the conclusion of such 
investigation without delay—3 days after beginning the investigation—on Friday, 
May 2, 2008 (R. 11; R. 55, lines 24-29; R. 95, lines 32-34; R. 130, lines 1-2). 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.994-405-206(2) states that if the discharge did not 
occur immediately after the employer became aware of the offense, a presumption 
arises that there were other reasons for the discharge. However, UTAH ADMIN. 
CODE r.994-405-206(2) also states that the presumption that a particular offense 
was not the cause of the discharge may be overcome by showing the delay was 
necessary to accommodate further investigation related to the claimant's conduct. 
In this case, although MRI was given "notice" of alleged conduct of Davis 
on April 29, 2008, MRI did not actually become "aware" of such conduct until it 
had an opportunity to conduct an investigation, which it conducted immediately 
after being put on notice concerning the alleged conduct, and which it completed 
in two to three days (R. 11). And, MRI discharged Davis immediately after 
completing its investigation—only three (3) days after it first received notice of 
the alleged conduct of Davis (R. 11). Accordingly, the record shows either that 
Davis was terminated immediately after MRI became aware of the "offense" (only 
3 days after receiving notice of the alleged offense), or that a short delay (of only 3 
days) was necessary to accommodate further investigation into Davis' alleged 
conduct. Therefore, there is no basis in the record for the Board to claim that MRI 
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failed to establish a proper relationship or nexus in time between the conduct that 
constituted the alleged cause for discharge and the discharge. 
4. The ALJWBoard's findings did not support the alternate theory 
The only factual findings made by the ALJ related to a potential "proximate 
cause" issue were the following: 
The Claimant often took his lunch break in the lunch area where 
production staff also took their breaks. The Claimant told the staff 
that he felt there were problems with the way that the company was 
operated. He did not give specific information about the situation, 
but mentioned that he believed cash reserves were too low and 
payroll too high. These discussions occurred approximately twice a 
week. In late April the president of the company and the human 
resources manager interviewed several people about the Claimant's 
comments. They were concerned that some production staff 
members seemed to have specific information about the company's 
finances. The Claimant was discharged on May 2, 2008. (R. 95). 
In its decision, the Board did not make any "factual findings" per se, but 
did make the following conclusions related to the issue of "proximate cause" 
under the heading of "Reasoning and Conclusions of Law": 
The Employer had a comment box and received approximately ten 
anonymous notes with complaints about the Claimant. The HR 
manager interviewed four or five people about the Claimant 
discussing "confidential financial information" and "bad-mouthing" 
the manner in which the officers were running the company. After 
interviewing four or five employees, the HR manager decided to let 
the Claimant go immediately, rather than follow the Employer's 
progressive discipline policy (R. 129-130). 
Finally, the ALJ made the following "conclusions of law" regarding the 
offense that led to Davis' discharge: 
The Employer provided no final incident that led to the Claimant's 
discharge, but argues that the Claimant habitually "badmouthed" the 
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company and the management. The Employer further argues that 
the Claimant was discharged because he revealed confidential 
financial information about the company to nonmanagement and 
nonaccounting personnel (R. 97). 
None of the factual findings or legal conclusions set forth above support a 
conclusion that there was a significant delay between MRTs discovery of Davis' 
conduct in disclosing confidential information and the date of discharge. And, 
such factual findings and legal conclusions refer to the fact that MRI interviewed 
several employees about Davis" conduct, and then terminated Davis immediately 
after concluding such interviews. As was stated above, a short delay prior to 
discharge is allowable if it was necessary to accommodate further investigation 
related to the claimant's conduct. See, UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.994-405-206(2). 
Therefore, the Board's theory that there was a lack of relationship in time between 
the stated cause of discharge and the discharge is not supported by the findings— 
the findings support the opposite conclusion, namely, that there was no significant 
delay between MRTs discovery of Davis' offensive conduct and Davis' discharge. 
None of the findings of the ALJ or the Board support the Board's argument 
that there was no nexus between the stated cause of the discharge and the 
discharge. The Board argues that there was no proximate cause, because MRJ did 
not rely on first hand information in determining that Davis had disclosed 
confidential financial information of MRI. However, UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.994-
405-206(1) states that if "an employer discharged a claimant because of 
preliminary evidence, but did not obtain 'proof of conduct until after the 
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separation notice was given, it may still be concluded the discharge was caused by 
the conduct the employer was investigating." In this case, it was ultimately 
proved that Davis improperly disclosed MRTs confidential financial information. 
Therefore, there was no lack of proximate cause, even though MRI may have 
discharged Davis based on preliminary information. 
Furthermore, by treating the potential issue of "proximate cause" as a "non-
issue" in the manner set forth above (by making no specific rulings about such 
issue), the ALJ/Board implicitly ruled that MRI satisfied its burden of proof in 
establishing "proximate cause" between the alleged offense and the discharge. 
Finally, the Board argued that MRI did not meet its burden in proving 
alternate grounds for discharge—as the corollary to the Board's argument that 
proximate cause was not established. However, the record would support a "just 
cause" discharge based on the alternate basis of insubordination concerning the 
use of profane language. The ALJ made the following factual findings, which 
were adopted in full by the Board: (1) The accounts receivable clerk heard Davis 
use profane language; (2) she reported the conduct to management; (3) on January 
11, 2008, Davis received a verbal warning not to use profane language in the 
workplace; (4) Davis continued to use profane language after the warning. 
Davis had "knowledge" of the conduct MRI expected, whereas he received 
a formal warning not to use profane language in the workplace. See, UTAH 
ADMIN. CODE r.994-405-202(2). Davis' continued use of profane language after 
he received the warning showed repeated carelessness or unreasonable lack of 
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care, so "control" over the conduct was established. See, UTAH ADMIN. CODE 
r.994-405-202(3). The fact that Davis repeated the conduct, even though he knew 
it was offensive to another employee8 (and therefore, could adversely affect 
employee morale) satisfied the "culpability" element of a "just cause" termination. 
Such conduct was (1) a violation of company policy, (2) which could potentially 
affect employee morale, and (3) which was likely to be repeated or was not an 
isolated incident of poor judgment (see previous argument on pp. 9-10). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the Agency's decision, 
which allowed unemployment benefits to Davis. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of May, 2009. 
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8
 Davis admitted during his testimony, referring to his co-worker, Amy Sims, that "I'd curse sometimes 
and, you know, she'd - she'd gasp or something like that. Or she might - she might look at me kind of 
strangely, or something like that (R. 81, lines 1-6). 
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